Das Böse bei F.W.J. Schelling (1809-1810)

Aberratio a centro. Das Böse bei F.W.J. Schelling (1809-1810)

Promotion Dr. Ana Carrasco-Conde

The issue of evil has always been one of the main problems in Philosophy. In Schelling’s case, this problem is analysed in detail –with disturbing results- in Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (1809) and in Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen (1810). In Schelling, evil is treated in relation to freedom and will, but also in the manifestation of a system which takes on its meaning within the workings of God’s life; it is evil as a philosophical concept, but also, and more importantly, an evil which has effects here and now, which affects us, which is effective. The Freiheitschrift deals, indeed, with the essence of human freedom, but also with other «related topics or issues», topics which point precisely to the ontotheological challenges of the Philosopher. And, since Schelling’s arguments are ontotheological, his approach is not only ontological and theological; but also, with regard to the effectiveness of evil, it draws on anthropology, i.e. the system continues manifesting itself through the possibilities of human experience. This same manifestation will link the concept of evil – and its possibility and its effectiveness – with the forces which interweave in the workings of the system, thus explaining the need for evil. Therefore, possibility, effectiveness and necessity, that is, the Kantian categories of modality, can be considered the guididng concepts behind Schelling’s research on evil. Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Félix Duque Pajuelo, Prof. Dr. Jörg Jantzen

Laufzeit: 15.09.2006 - 25.06.2009